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The Courts' Inherent Power To Compel Legislative Funding of
Judicial Functions
The complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential
in a limited constitution.
-Alexander Hamilton*

The recurrent fiscal crises that confront &tate and local governments exert serious budgetary pressure on the courts. 1 Although the
judiciary consumes a very small proportion of public resources,2 an
expanding judicial workload3 and lagging appropriations4 have significantly impaired the operation of many court systems. 5
Inadequate funding poses a potentially grave threat to the independence of the judiciary and to the private law rights of individual
citizens. Courts have responded to this potential threat by developing the doctrine of inherent power to compel appropriations from
the other branches of government.6 This theory has evolved from
some earlier cases, which invoked the courts' inherent power to justify compelling appropriations for specified judicial needs, into a
broader and more frequently invoked assertion of judicial auton• THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
l. See, e.g. , Dolan, Justice Delayed -As Funds Grow Short, Courts Around the U.S. Musi
Appealfor Relief, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
2. In 1965-1966, for example, the judiciary received 1% of the federal budget, 6% of state
budgets, and 6.3% of county budgets. Saari, Open .Doors to Justice: An Overview of Financing
in America, JUDICATURE, May 1967, at 296.
3. See C. MANNING, JUDGESHIP CRITERIA (1973); Lawson & Gletne, Cutback Management in the Judicial Branch: Controlling Costs Without Courting Disaster, 1 JUST. SYs. J. 44
(1982).
4. See, e.g., Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 277, 280 (1971);
Lawson & Gletne, supra note 3, at 44; Dolan, supra note 1.
5. The very number of inherent power cases, see notes 7-8 and 11 infra, suggests the scope
of the problem. A fiscal crisis can severely retard the functioning of a judicial system:
The effect of all this upon the moral ~ic) of the court is obvious. Employees do not
know from day-to-day wliether they have their jobs. The court is unable to implement
docket control methods to decrease our backlog, and probation services are threatened, as
are family counseling services. The Friend of the Court staff is so depleted that it cannot
properly handle its important functions. Judicial efficiency is threatened by the loss of
secretaries. Only three law clerks are available for the entire court. In short, this crisis has
had and will have a devastating effect upon the delivery of proper judicial services.
Gilmore, 17te Day the Detroit Courts Ran Out of Money, 19 JUDGES J. 36, 39 (1980).
6. These cases typically involve city and county governments, charged by state legislation
with at least a portion of the responsibility for funding the courts. See C. BAAR, SEPARATE
BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN AMERICA 6-7 (1975). At present, 27 states have
assumed responsibility for financing the state courts. See Tobin, Managing the Shift to State
Court Financing, 1 JusT. SYS. J. 70 (1982).
This Note necessarily adopts general terminology to discuss issues common to the state
court systems. "Legislature" or legislative branch" refers to the elected authority from whom
the court seeks additional funding; the "constitution" refers to the state constitution.
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omy.7 The doctrine has become well accepted in the cases, 8 but has
generated an extensive body of primarily .critical commentary. 9
Litigation results when the legislative branch contests the inherent power order. Because judicial compulsion of legislative action
must derive from constitutional authority, 10 and because of the practical and doctrinal challenges such litigation presents, many courts
have struggled to resolve these cases in a principled fashion. 11 This
Note defends the inherent power doctrine, but argues that current
judicial approaches to its application have failed to confront
7. For earlier cases, see, e.g., State ex rel Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392
(1913); State ex rel Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P.2d 689 (1902) (per curiam); Moynahan v. City of New York, 205 N.Y. 181, 98 N.E. 482 (1912);In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35
Wis. 410 (1874).
8. Only the Supreme Court of Alabama has explicitly rejected the doctrine. See Morgan
County Commn. v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So. 2d 830 (1974). A few other courts have
avoided the issue by resting a result on statutory grounds. See Young v. Board of County
Commnrs., 9 Nev. 52, 530 P.2d 1203 (1975).
An otherwise unanimous body of decision has upheld the existence of inherent power to
compel appropriations. See, e.g., Deddens v. Cochise County, 113 Ariz. 75, 546 P.2d 811
(1976); Millholen v. Riley, 211 Cal 29,293 P. 69 (1930); Wadlowv. Kanaly, 182 Colo.115, 511
P.2d 484 (1973); People ex rel Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966); McAfee
v. State ex rel Stodola, 258 Ind. 677, 284 N.E.2d 778 (1972); Webster County Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1978); Jefferson County ex rel Grauman v. Jefferson
County Fiscal Court, 301 Ky. 405, 192 S.W.2d 185 (1946); O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the
County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,287 N.E.2d 608 (1972); Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne
County, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969) (Black, J., concurring), revd on rehearing per
curiam, 386 Mich 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972);
State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam); Board of
Commrs. v. Eleventh Judicial Dist. Court, 182 Mont. 463, 597 P.2d 728 (1979); Azbarea v.
North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 109, 590 P.2d 161 (1979); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441
(1966); In re Board of Commrs., 4 N.C. App. 626, 167 S.E.2d 488 (1969); State ex rel Lorig v.
Board of Commrs., 52 Ohio St. 2d 70, 369 N.E.2d 1046 (1977) (per curiam); Commonwealth ex
rel Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45,274 A.2d 193 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (dicta); Zylstra v. Piva, 85
Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823 (1975); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 569 (1974).
9. See Brennan,supra note 4; Bukowsld,Inherenl Power ofthe Court-A New Direction?,
54 Wis. B. BULL. 22 (1981); Burke, Tlte Inherent Power of the Courts, 51 JUDICATURE 247
(1974); Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, 7 TRIAL 22 (1971); Note, Judicial Financial
Autonomy and Inherent Power, 51 CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972); Constitutional Law: The Inherent Power ofthe Courts to Appropriate Moneyfar "Reasonably Necessary" Expenditures, 55
MARQ. L. REv. 392 (1972); Comment, Inherent Power and Administrative Court Reform, 58
MARQ. L. REv. 133 (1974); Comment, Courts - Judge's Power lo Bind Contractually County
Treasuryfar Courtroom Necessities, 1 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1136 (1972); Comment, Stale Court
Assertion ofPower to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1187 (1972);
Comment, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1236 (1972).
10. The legislature, of course, has power to appropriate as it pleases unless constrained by
the higher law of the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). This
is especially important because the legislature's appropriations power itself derives from the
Constitution.
I 1. See, e.g., O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 287
N.E.2d 608 (1972); Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228
(1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451
S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam); Commonwealth ex rel Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274
A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1970). This selection fairly represents the
leading cases.
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squarely the central issues raised by inherent power orders. The
Note advocates an alternative procedure for defining the legitimate
scope of judicial authority to compel appropriations on its own behalf. Part I examines the constitutional basis of the doctrine, and
concludes that although constitutional considerations justify the inherent power doctrine, they also require that the courts closely link
the assertion of the doctrine to the constitutional imperatives that
justify it. Part II examines the court's current approach to the review
of inherent power orders, and argues that current procedures bear no
rational relation to confining inherent power within its legitimate
boundaries. Part III, therefore, proposes an alternative procedure to
address directly, and overcome to the extent possible, the constitutional, political, and practical problems created by assertions of judicial power to compel appropriations.

l.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INHERENT JUDICIAL
POWER To COMPEL APPROPRIATIONS

A. Separation of Powers

The federal and state constitutions embody a system of separation ofpowers. 12 Constitutional separation of powers among legislative, executive, and judicial branches depends on two related
concepts. The first is functional differentiation: no branch may
usurp a function properly belonging to another. 13 The second is
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1, art. II,§ 1, art. III,§ 1. The separation of powers concept
enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Framers. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J.
Madison) (J. Cook ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961). The Framers traced the idea to Montesquieu, but it derived from a more ancient heritage. See ARISTOTLE'S PoLmcs, BOOK IV, ch. 14, at 154 (B. Jowett trans. 2d ed. 1931); J.
LocKE, TREATISE OF CML GOVERNMENT AND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 97-99
(Sherman ed. 1937); 1 B. DE MONTISQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XI, ch. 6, at 152
(I'. Nugent trans. 1823). See generally Ervin, Separation ofPowers: Judicial Independence, 35
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 108 (1970); Fairlie, The Separation ofPowers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393
(1922); Sharp, The Classical American .Doctrine of "Separation ofPowers," 2 U. Cm. L. REv.
385 (1935).
Many state constitutions express the concept explicitly. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. II.,§§ 1-

2:
Section 1. The powers of government of the state are divided into three separate
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.
Section 2. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches,
nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of
the others.
Such provisions invariably fail, however, to indicate the precise powers that "belong" to each
branch. They thus beg the .question whether the appropriations power can, in extreme cases,
"belong" to the judiciary.
13. This differentiation cannot be absolute. To operate properly, and to perform their
functions fully, each branch must engage in some activities constitutionally within the province of the other branches. For instance, both the courts and the legislature must engage in
some executive or administrative activities in performing their constitutional functions, and
the executive and the judiciary must exercise some legislative power in making rules to govern
the internal functioning of their branches. These activities are necessary to the ability of each
branch to perform its functions, and are thus incidental powers each branch possesses. See C.
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checks and balances: no branch should have the power to direct the
course of government policy unchecked by the other branches. 14
Constitutional power over taxing and spending lies with the legislature, and, to the extent of the veto power, the executive. 15 Nevertheless, the exercise of the appropriations power may offend the
separation of powers in either of two ways. First, if the legislative
appropriations decision effectively disposes of matters before the judiciary, the spending power will have swallowed the judicial power
entirely. In such a situation, the legislature has usurped a judicial
function, thereby offending the foundation of separate governmental
departments. 16
Second, below a certain level of financial support, the judiciary
may lose the ability to check the other branches of government effectively. In rare instances, the very existence of the judicial branch
may become endangered, risking the complete collapse of the tripartite structure.17 More commonly, dependence on the legislature for
the means of operation may threaten the independence of the
courts. 18 Judicial sensitivity to the appropriations problem might
BAAR, supra note 6, at 155; J. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2-3 (1973); see
also In re Salaries for Probation Officers, 58 N.J. 422,425,278 A.2d 417,418 (1971) ("But the
doctrine of the separation of powers was never intended to create and certainly never did
create, utterly exclusive spheres of competence. The compartmentalization of governmental
powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches has never been watertight.").
14. This aspect of the doctrine appears consistently in the statements of the Framers of the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
15. In/n re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232,552 P.2d 163 (1976), the Supreme Court of
Washington described the "awkward position of courts in the governmental budgeting
process":
No authority rests in the judiciary to appropriate funds, as a legislative body does, nor
to exercise the power of the veto as a bargaining device, as may the executive. In most
states, its only means of direct participation in the budgeting process is by intervention, in
the form of litigation, to compel the payment of funds for the court system.
87 Wash. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166.
16. In Municipal Court Bloodgood, 137 Cal. App. 3d 29, 186 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1982), the
state accounting office identified the following consequences of a new austerity budget on the
courts:
(l) Consolidation of all municipal court districts;
(2) Virtual elimination of civil calendars;
(3) Elimination of small claims court cases;
(4) Cutbacks on the criminal misdemeanor calendar;
(5) The closure of 22 separate courthouses; and
(6) The resulting violation of several provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Penal
Code, and Constitutional guarantees of due process.
137 Cal. App. 3d at 36-37, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 810. If an appropriations decision results in the
"elimination of civil calendars," or identifiable violation of state law, fiscal pressure rather
than legal judgment has decided the cases.
17. See, e.g., notes 5 & l6supra.
18. The risk was prominent among the concerns of the revolutionary generation. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348-49 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961):
It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were
the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the Legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
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weaken the scrutiny applied to legislation of dubious constitutionality, or tempt the courts to favor the legislature over the executive in
cases of inter-branch dispute.1 9 Finally, even if the courts continue
to function, at least nominally, and do not respond to any perceptions of legislative pressure, the judiciary may lose its ability to police the application of the law, thereby abrogating a judicial function
to the executive.20
B. Limits to the Inherent Power Analysis

The tripartite structure of government established by the constitution provides a persuasive initial argument for the courts' current
approach. 21 But two related objections disturb the case for judicial
power to compel appropriation. First, and fundamentally, does not
the assignment of appropriations power to the judges itself offend
the separation of powers? Second, and unavoidably, what are the
limits of this inherent power?
Modem courts do not discount this possibility. See, e.g., Carlson v. State ex rel Stodola,
247 Ind. 631, 633-34, 220 N.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1966):
It is axiomatic that the courts must be independent and must not be subject to the whim of
either the executive or legislative departments. The security of human rights and the
safety of free institutions require freedom of action on the part of the court. Courts from
time immemorial have been the refuge of those who have been aggrieved and oppressed
by official and arbitrary actions under the guise of governmental authority. It is the protector of those oppressed by unwarranted official acts under the assumption of authority.
Our sense of justice tells us that a court is not free if it is under financial pressure, whether
it be from a city council or other legislative body, in the consideration of the rights of
some individual who is affected by some alleged autocratic or unauthorized official action
of such a body. One who controls the purse strings can control how tightly those purse,
strings are drawn, and the very existence of a dependent. Justice, as well as the security of
human rights and the safety of free institutions requires freedom of action of courts in
hearing cases of those aggrieved by official actions, to their injury.
See also Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 40, 384 P.2d 738, 741 (1963) ("the courts must be
independent, unfettered, and free from directives, influence, or interference from any extraneous source").
19. See note 18 supra. This effect may operate either directly, or more subtly, as chronic
judicial dependence results in attracting those least distrustful of and most deferential to, the
legislator.
20. The judges must pass upon search warrant requests, supervise the conduct of grand
jury investigations, and conduct supression hearings. At a given extremity of fiscal pressure,
these tasks are performed, if at all, in only a cursory fashion, leaving executive officials essentially free of judicial oversight.
21. A court might also ground an inherent power order on fourteenth amendment due
process or its state constitutional counterpart, although no court appears to have taken this
route. Superficial adjudication caused by underfunding might offend procedural due process
standards by disposing of "life, liberty, or property'' without a meaningful hearing. Alternatively, a court might deem access to a functioning judicial system an historically protected
interest "fundamental" to the "concepts of ordered liberty," thus qualifying for substantive
due process protections.
This argument largely duplicates the separation of powers claim. To fulfill its constitutionalfanction, the courts must have sufficient funds to adjudicate the cases brought before
them. At the point where the courts, due to fiscal pressure, cease deciding cases according to
the reasoned elaboration of the law (the core of either due process claim}, they have ceased
also to be courts. See notes 25-28 i,ifra and accompanying text.
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To be sure, inherent power necessarily confers on the judiciary
some of the legislature's appropriations power.22 But the alternative
permits the constitutional eclipse of the judicial branch. In resolving
this dilemma, persuasive reasons justify favoring inherent power
over limitless legislative discretion.
First, the relative constitutional risks support inherent power. An
inadequate legislative appropriation risks the autonomy, and perhaps the functional existence, of the judicial department. By contrast, even a grossly excessive judicially ordered expenditure will do
little to diminish the power of the legislature. 23 Increasing the judicial share of the local budget from, say, five to seven percent exerts
relatively little impact on the appropriations power. Still less might
such an increase threaten the autonomy or existence of the legislative
or executive departments. But it may mean the difference between a
court system that is capable of administering justice and one that is
not.
Second, the institutional role of the judiciary offers two reasons
to entrust it with inherent power. First, the judicial function is to
declare the rights of the parties according to the law. 24 Judicial
method resolves disputes not by weighing the returns to the judges,
or by following individual intuition, but by exercising judgment derived from accepted value premises.25 In the inherent power context,
the issue is whether a particular appropriations statute offends the
constitutional separation of powers. Marbury resolved this issue at
22. This is neither surprising nor unprecedented:
It is the imperfection of human institutions which gives rise to our notion of inherent
power. It is simply impossible for a judge to do nothing but judge; a legislator to do
nothing but legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute the laws. The proper exercise
of each of these three great powers of government necessarily includes some ancillary
inherent capacity to do things which are normally done by the other departments.
Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 383 Mich. 10, 20-21, 172 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1969),
revd. on rehearing per curiam, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923
(1972).
The Supreme Court has not hesitated to compel legislative appropriations in other contexts
when the Constitution so required. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare residency test violates equal protection); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right
to counsel for indigents in felony prosecutions).
23. See note 2 supra and accompanying text (courts consume small percentage of public
resources).
24. This was the view of the Framers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803). This corresponds with the duties of the other
branches: the legislature establishes subconstitutional law; the executive enforces it. The judiciary interprets and applies the law when litigants dispute its meaning in a particular case.
25. See C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 517 (1981) ("Judicial review insures that the most fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and
not simply issues of political power, a transformation that cannot succeed, in any case not
fully, within the legislature itself."). Even without any accepted connection between positive
law and social values,judges will attempt to follow the law, if only to preserve their authority,
See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 142-43 (1962).

\
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the dawn of the republic. 26 Insofar as "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," and
insofar as the constitution is law, the responsibility for resolving the
conflict between the statute and the constitution lies exclusiv~ly with
the judiciary.27 The virtues of judicial review may be arguable, but
the institution's existence is now practically secure, and reserves to
the judiciary the final authority for constitutional interpretation.28
But, it might be objected, a case in which the judicial branch has
an important stake differs significantly from the ordinary case of judicial review. The objection is unfounded in light of the contemporary critique of judicial review in general.29 Every case of judicial
review directly involves the scope of judicial power. To point to inherent power cases as presenting a special issue of bias assumes that
the temptation of power reaches its maximum force at the lowest ebb
of power, that judges will more likely deviate from a fair interpretation of the constitution to secure a few dollars for probation officers
than to constitutionalize passionate opinions about racial equality,30
economic liberty,31 or abortion.32 In short, every constitutional case
necessarily implies concomitant reduction or expansion in judicial
power. The case for judicial review has prevailed despite this element of judicial interest in constitutional controversies. Judicial
temptation does not distinguish the inherent powers situation.
Related to the normative method of judicial decisionmaking is
the sheer political weakness of the courts:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
27. "Insofar as constitutional interpretation and adjudication of controversies are concerned, it is for the judicial department to determine whether any department has exceeded its
constitutional functions." Webster County Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 873
(Iowa 1978).
28. Judicial review now rests not only on Marbury, or the arguments in THE FEDERALIST
No. 78 (A. Hamilton), but "also on the visible, active, and long-continued acquiescence of
Congress in the Court's performance of this function." C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP 1N CoNSTITUTlONAL LAW 71 (1969). Whatever the status of federal-state relations,
that same acquiesence characterizes the approach of most state legislatures to judicial review
by state courts.
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST at 63-69 (1980) (judges usurp majority
power whenever they wield constitutional authority based on perceptions of "fundamental
rights").
30. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S 483 (1954); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. l "(1959).
31. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo!ft A-Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973).
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community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are
to be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over
either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of
the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.
It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.33

From the perspective of realpolitik, the judiciary offers the safest repository for the extraordinary authority inherent in the choice. between the powers to compel a legislative appropriation or cripple
another branch of government. Moreover, only through the conferral of some such power can the judiciary gain a card to play in the
effort to resolve a funding dispute without litigation.34
Finally, these institutional aspects of the judicial function will
contribute to the responsible exercise of the inherent power. The
courts' most critical resource is their perceived legitimacy, a legitimacy directly implicated by inherent power orders. The judiciary
has every incentive to preserve its perceived legitimacy by invoking
the inherent power doctrine only when constitutionally required. 35
These institutional factors weigh heavily on behalf of resolving
the inherent power dilemma in favor of the judiciary. But this does
not justify the inference, drawn by too many courts, that the inherent
power extends to the "reasonable" costs of court administration. 36
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
34. Judicial weakness also tends to deflect the argument that, even if the doctrine of inherent power does not usurp legislative authority, it may remove an important check on judicial
power. See Comment, Stale Court Assertion of Power to .Determine and .Demand its Own
Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1187, 1196 (1972). This argument assumes that judicial power is
both dangerous and unchecked but for financial constraints. But, while all political power is
dangerous, judicial power offers less of a risk than legislative power. Moreover, the selective
process, whether elective, appointive, or mixed, offers an important check short of removal
from office.
Finally, the notion that the risks of judicial power justify manipulation of the court budget
is simply misconceived. The judiciary, unlike the executive, has no role in the budget process,
See note 15supra. Such a "check" against judicial activity, which can succeed only by bendingjudicial interpretation of the law closer to the desires of the legislature, contradicts the very
nature of the judicial function. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. Thus, in contrast to the appointment process, the budgetary check is an illegitimate check on judicial
authority.
35. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The
Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.").
36. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,510,287
N.E.2d 608, 612 (1972) (inherent power protects courts "from impairment"); State ex rel
Weinstein v. St Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. 1970) (per curiam) (Court has inherent power to hire "reasonably necessary'' employees); Commonwealth ex rel Carroll v. Tate,
44 Pa. 45, 57, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Court must prove appropriation is "'reasonably necessary'
for its proper functioning and administration"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); McAfee v.
State ex rel Stodola, 258 Ind. 677, 682, 284 N.E.2d 778, 782 (1972) (judges must limit their
requests to those things reasonably necessary in the operation of their courts and to refrain
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Any compelled appropriation in excess of the constitutionally required minimum offends the legislature's appropriations power, betraying rather than fulfilling the separation of powers concept which
justifies inherent power in the first instance. This discussion implies,
then, that a court invoking the inherent power must (a) link each
aspect of its order to a constitutionally required judicial function,
and (b) offer objective findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the constitutional connection.
Many courts, of course, have expressed sensitivity to the limits of
inherent power and the need for legitimacy in its application. Part II
explores the current judicial approach to containing inherent power.
II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INHERENT POWER DOCTRINE

A. The Burden of ProofApproach

While the practical and theoretical problems created by the inherent power doctrine have not led most courts to reject it,37 some
courts have sought means to avert or mitigate these dangers. A few
courts have imposed exhaustion of remedies requirements38 or made
approval of a superior authority within the court system a prerequisite to a funding order.39 Many courts, however, have relied primarily on assigning the burden of proof, with varying evidentiary
standards, to the court attempting to obtain the funds. 40
from any extravagant, arbitrary or unwarranted expenditures"). This standard reflects the predominant approach.
Unfortunately, the "reasonable necessity" standard divorces the scope of an inherent
power order from the constitutional doctrine justifying judicial exercise of the spending power.
Constitutional separation of power principles either require a specific expenditure or they do
not. What the trial judge believes to be "reasonably necessary" to the effective functioning of
his court bears no inherent relation to the requirements of the constitution. Similarly, "impairment" of a court's functioning is irrelevant because the prior, unimpaired functioning of
the court may have been more or less than the constitution required.
It might be objected that no certain line is possible in defining the minimum constitutional
level of judicial functioning. But judges draw this line implicitly each time they invoke the
inherent power doctrine, for that doctrine can extend no further than the minimum constitutionally required judicial presence. See Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 57, 66 A.2d 577, 579
(1949) ("Control of state.finances rests with the legislature, subject only to constitutional limitations . . . .") (emphasis in original).
37. See note 8 supra.
38. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 516, 287
N.E.2d 608, 615 (1972); State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo.
1970) (per curiam); In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 250, 552 P.2d 163, 173 (1976).
39. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,516,287
N.E.2d 608, 615 (1972); Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 9, 190 N.W.2d
228, 242 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972); see also Burke, The Inherent Powers of the
Courts, 51 JUDICATURE 247 (1974) (a highly favorable analysis of the procedure in Massachusetts); Connors, Inherent Power of the Courts - Management Tool or Rhetorical Weapon?, 1
JusT. SYS. J. 63 (1974) (favorable discussion of O'Coin's).
40. See, e.g., Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 154-56, 439 A.2d 638, 647-48 (1981); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 55, 274 A.2d 193, 199, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974
(1971); In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 250-51, 552 P.2d 163, 173-74 (1976).
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This allocation of the burden of proof arguably exerts an important restraining influence on the courts in several ways. First, a
heavy burden of proof may discourage the exercise of inherent
power in the first instance, limiting the doctrine's use to extreme
cases of judicial necessity, 41 where the case for the doctrine is strongest and public understanding of the need to divert scarce funds is
more easily achieved. 42 Second, allocating the burden to the courts
tends to counteract the legislature's disadvantage of having to argue
in a judicial, and possibly biased, forum. 43 The reviewing court need
not weigh the relative merits of the cases of the legislature and the
lower court, but can focus exclusively on whether the court exercising inherent power has met its burden ofproof.44 Third, the burden
of proof approach offers the rhetorical advantage of presenting the
public with a judicial claim upheld after resolving doubtful issues in
favor of the legislature.45
B. Defects in the Burden of Proof Approach

Part I concluded that constitutional principles justify inherent
power to compel appropriations, provided that a constitutional basis
exists for each aspect of the order and that the court acts legitimately
in reaching its decision.46 The current burden of proof approach
does little to further either criterion.
I. Constitutional Basis

Relying on the burden of proof to contain judicial power in the
inherent power context obscures the fundamental question at issue
in these cases, that is, what level of judicial functioning does the constitution require? 47 Instead of addressing this question directly, the
courts' approach treats as a matter of evidence and proof what is
ultimately a question oflaw.48 Rarely will a geniune dispute exist as
41. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 249-51, 552 P.2d 163, 173-74 (1976).
42. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d at 251, 552 P.2d at 172.
43. See Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 155-56, 439 A.2d 638, 648 (1981),
44. See Becken v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 155, 439 A.39 at 648.
45. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d at 251-52, 552 P.2d at 174-75.
46. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
47. The reluctance to face this question is understandable. The difficulty of drawing a
clear line between constitutionally necessary and constitutionally unnecessary appropriations,
however, is not diminished by side-stepping the issue. If anything, focusing on artificial analyses increases the likelihood of inaccurately resolving this central question by ensuring that the
courts avoid seriously considering it. A failure to face squarely this question is merely an
unprincipled way to resolve the issue - it does not succeed in making the issue go away. See
note 36 supra.
48. The burden of proof means very little when the facts are not disputed. The coun must
then resolve the legal issue, however difficult, not with reference to a standard of proof, but
according to its best understanding of the law. A difficult legal issue, for example, does not
preclude summary judgment if the facts are not in issue. See Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
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to what judicial services an additional fixed amount of money can
buy.49 Rather, the dispute turns on whether the undeniable increment of services attributable to the funding forced by court order is
necessary to the constitutional functioning of the judicial branch.
If taken literally, the burden ofproofrequirement would amount
to an entirely illusory limit on judicial power, for the factual consequences of a given level of appropriations are susceptible to objective, conclusive proof. Conversely, if reviewing courts translate the
rhetorical force of the burden of proof standard into an implied
judgment that the constitution approves minimal levels of judicial
functioning, the inherent power doctrine may do very little to protect
the autonomy of the courts. In short, the burden of proof approach
bears no rational relation to the fundamental issue of whether or not
specific appropriations are necessary to the minimum constitutionally permissible judicial presence.
2. Legitimacy

A close analysis of the burden of proof approach also reveals that
it offers little in the way of legitimate decisionmaking. If the reviewing court in fact harbors a pro-judicial bias, this favoritism will express itself as easily in the conclusion that the lower court "met its
burden" as in a finding that the lower court persuasively linked specific judicial functions threatened by low appropriation to the constitutional requirement of an independent judiciary. Indeed, couching
the inquiry in terms clearly unrelated to the issue can, once understood, only contribute to the belief that the judiciary is exercising
guile and not judgment.50
Given that the current focus on the burden of proof offers at best
a misguided limit on the inherent power doctrine, Part III advances
several procedures to improve the doctrine's practical application.
529 F.2d 721, 728 n.13 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, if both parties agreed that a given appropriation
would not suffice to provide, say, a court stenographer, it would be unusual for a court to hold
that the court below had introduced "clear and convincing proof' that stenographic records of
judicial proceedings are essential to the constitutional functioning of the courts. Given its
relative unimportance, the burden of proof in inherent power cases should rest with whatever
party would otherwise bear it in an analogous civil case. Emphasizing this issue in inherent
power cases serves only to divert attention from the underlying constitutional dispute.
49. None of the cases cited in note 8, supra, for example, involved any issue as to how the
denial of the appropriations sought by the judiciary would affect the services offered by courts.
SO. Cf. Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81
MICH. L. REV. 604, 661-63 (1983) (Constitutional analysis should address underlying value
judgments, rather than speak in a rhetorical code).

1698

Ill.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1687

IMPROVED APPROACHES To IMPLEMENTING THE INHERENT
POWER DOCTRINE

A. Issuance of an Inherent Power Order
Some jurisdictions have adopted common-sense procedures for
the initial determination by a lower court that only an inherent
power order can provide constitutionally necessary funds. First, exhaustion of established legislative procedures to obtain desired funds
should precede any court order. 51 Second, the judge considering an
order should obtain the written approval of the chief judge of his or
her court,52 who should inform both the legislature and the state
supreme court of the possibility that an order may issue. 53 This procedure offers an initial check on the first judge's determination and
informs the legislature specifically of the court's concern. Nor
should such a procedure consume much time; excessive delays can
do serious damage to the court system while an inherent power order
waits in limbo.54
Once these preconditions to an order are fulfilled, and the initial
judge resolves that an order remains necessary, the judge should issue the inherent power order. The order should set forth specific
findings of fact, identifying the judicial functions that will be foregone absent specific increments of funding. The order should also
include specific conclusions of law, indicating why each appropriation ordered is required, either independently or in combination
with other aspects of the order, by the constitution. 55
51. This requirement now seems well accepted. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 569, 586 (1974).
52. See O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 516, 287
N.E.2d 608, 615 (1972).
53. The Michigan Supreme Court requires both notice and prior approval by the State
Court Administrator before an inherent power order may issue. See Wayne Circuit Judges v.
Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 9, 190 N.W.2d 228, 242 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972).
54. See C. BAAR, supra note 6, at 147 ("A plaintiff court may not seek enforcement of a
money judgement ~ic J, since the appellate court decision may come so late in the fiscal year of
the original suit that the award could not be expended before the beginning of a new fiscal
year.").
55. Judge Adams adopted a similar approach in his separate opinion in Wayne Judges:
I would use the inherent power of the courts only in those cases where it is essential to
assure the continued existence or basic functioning of the courts. The test I would apply
would be the ability of a court to operate as a court, not whether the court can operate
more conveniently or expeditiously if it has some additional means to carry out its functions. For example, a court stenographer is essential for the proper functioning of a court
of record. If one were not provided, a court of record under its inherent power could
supply one and compel the payment of an adequate salary.
I cannot agree, however, that the law clerks, probationary officers or a judicial assistant are so essential to the operation of the circuit court of Wayne county as to be a proper
case for invoking the doctrine of inherent power of the courts. I agree that the courts
would operate more efficiently if the judges were provided with law clerks, if the judges
had adequate probation services, and if the court had a judicial assistant. In the case of
probation officers, I would concede that the question is indeed a close one. But a line
must be drawn and, as I have indicated, I would draw it narrowly. I am convinced that
the courts will continue to function even if they are not provided with these services. The
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One possibility for framing such an order, which deserves
favorable consideration, is the appointment of a special master or
referee to come to preliminary :findings of fact. 56 The master should
be approved by both parties and command professional expertise in
the needs of judicial administration. Such an independent factfinder should initially evaluate the consequences of granting or denying the desired funding. This would include an analysis of the
court's workload and comparative efficiency. The fact-finder should
also enter findings on how the court will compare, in specific judicial
functions, with courts in other jurisdictions, on the alternative assumptions that the desired funds are or are not available.57
B. Advantages of the Proposed Procedures

1. Constitutional Accuracy

In contrast to current approaches, these procedures would focus
the reviewing court's concern directly on the difficult question of
what judicial functions are constitutionally indispensable. This
would enable appellate courts to develop a body of case law articucost is not insignificant-at least $200,000 per year. Consequently, this case involves a
direct confrontation between the inherent judicial power of the courts and the legislative
power to make appropriations. One or the other must give. Under our theory of government, the legislature or a subordinate legislative body has the power to appropriate for all
branches of government. Both the executive and judicial branches are required to present
their fiscal needs to the legislative branch for consideration by that branch and allocation
of available funds to all three branches of government based upon a legislative decision.
This is the process that should be followed here.
383 Mich. 10, 43-44, 172 N.W.2d 436,450 (1969) (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part), revd on rehg. per curiam, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 923
(1972). Other judges might reasonably decide that a court cannot "operate as a court" without
extensive research assistance. But only by casting the issue in these terms can such issues be
thoughtfully addressed. Only such a forthright approach to the question of what funds the
constitution requires can maintain the necessary link between the courts inherent power and
the constitutional principles from which that power derives.
56. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PR.oc. ConE §§ 638-645.1 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. CML
PR.Ac. LAW§§ 4301, 4311-4321 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.490.
57. An increasing body of analysis of judicial funding and court management has come
into existence in recent years. Financing studies of the courts of several states have been made.
See Hoffman, Court Financing: An Overview and Assessment, 7 JUST. Svs. J. 6 (1982). These
studies can be used to compare the level of funding in other jurisdictions with the level of
funding provided to the court invoking the inherent power; they can also be used to compare
caseloads. Some attempts at developing techniques to measure workload are being made, see
H. LAWSON & B. GLETNE, WORKLOAD MEASURES IN THE COURT (1980). A variety of other
articles on the administrative management of state trial courts are available. See, e.g., C.
MANNING, JUDGESHIP CRITERIA: STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING THE NEED FOR AnDmONAL
JUDGESHIPS (1973); L. BERKSON, S. HAYS, & S. CARBON, MANAGING THE STATE COURTS
(1977); H. LAWSON & B. GLETNE, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION IN STATE-FUNDED COURTS
(1981); R. TOBIN, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (Trial Court Management Series 1979); R.
TOBIN, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (Trial Court Management Series 1979). With reference to
courthouse facilities, see INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, EMERGING TRENDS
IN COURTHOUSE PLANNING, DESIGN, ADMINISTRATION, AND FUNDING (1975). The ABA
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL
COURTS (1976), provides guidance on levels of trial court performance.
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lating the m1mmum content of a constitutionally viable judicial
branch. The difficulty of the enterprise does not counsel against undertaking it; appellate courts are uniquely qualified to render such
constitutional judgments,58 and judicial experience in other areas no
less subtle or challenging confirms that workable standards are not
impossible to formulate. 59 In any event, such an approach offers the
best chance for preserving judicial autonomy with the least usurpation of legitimate legislative functions. In a world of imperfect institutions, achieving the best chance for the best outcome is not an
inconsequential achievement.
2. Legitimacy

Delegating fact-finding responsibility to an impartial expert
reduces the possibility of distorted decisionmaking due to judicial
bias.60 Such a procedure also enhances the legitimacy of the resulting review by forcing the court to confront the constitutional consequences of stipulated variations in judicial functioning. Surely
addressing the real question, however difficult, reflects a deeper
fidelity to the ideal of judicial method than the artificially confident
resolution of an irrelevant question. By treating the issue as one of
constitutional interpretation rather than of trial court discretion, appellate courts will not only cast the controversy in the terms of its
ultimate issues; they will also confirm that the inherent power controversy calls for the kind of judgments they alone are most qualified
to make.
CONCLUSION

Legislative power over appropriations can threaten the institutional autonomy of the judicial branch. This possibility fully justifies a limited grant of inherent power to the courts, based on the
constitutional provision for an independent judiciary. Consistent
recognition that this power extends no further than the constitutional
mandate which justifies it, and that the same principle of separation
of powers is affirmatively offended by a further extension of judicial
appropriations power, can ensure the principled and effective imple58. See note 27 supra.
59. The courts must draw many such lines in the course of constitutional adjudication.
When a court-appointed attorney fails to provide an indigent defendant t'jfeclive assistance of
counsel; when a government interest becomes "compelling"; or when a government classification becomes suspect, do not present fundamentally easier questions. But society charges the
judges to do the best they can with such issues, in light of judgment and experience, rather
than leaving such controversies to political resolution because of their moral difficulty. See
Dworkin, supra note 25, at 516-18.
60. A master's report will, typically, be subject to the objections of the parties, which the
court must then resolve. But obtaining an independent assessment in the first instance minimizes the chance that the courts will exaggerate their needs.

June 1983]

Note -

Courts' Inherent Power To Compel Funding

1701

mentation of the doctrine. The failure to recognize this limit by continuing to disguise the ultimate issue can only erode both the
constitutional system of separation of powers and the public's respect for judicial legitimacy.

